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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; evidence of a
rape victim's prior sexual conduct
Evidence Code §§782, 1127d (new); §1103 (amended); Govern-
ment Code §13961.5 (new).
SB 1678 (Robbins); STATS 1974, Ch 569
AB 3657 (Sieroty); STATS 1974, Ch 1091
AB 3660 (Sieroty); STATS 1974, Ch 1093
Support: California District Attorneys' and Police Officers' Associa-
tions; National Organization for Women
Opposition: A.C.L.U.; California Public Defenders' Association
Limits the circumstances under which evidence of an alleged
rape victim's prior sexual conduct may be introduced on the
issues of consent and credibility; provides for free medical exam-
inations of victims of rape; prohibits specified instructions from
being given to juries in rape trials.
Credibility of Victim
Section 782 has been -added to the Evidence Code to provide that
in any prosecution for rape [CAL. PEN. CODE §261] or for aiding and
abetting another in committing rape [CAL. PEN. CODE §264.1], or
for assault with intent -to commit, attempt -to commit, or conspiracy to
commit such crimes, a defendant wishing to introduce evidence of the
complaining witness' prior sexual conduct for the purpose of attacking
her credibility must make a written motion and affidavit to -the court
and prosecutor. The motion must state that the defendant has an
offer of proof regarding evidence of sexual conduct of the victim
which is relevant to the issue of the complaining witness' credibility;
the affidavit must state the offer of proof. If the court finds that the
offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall order a hearing out of -the
presence of any jury and at such hearing shall allow questioning of the
complaining witness regarding the offer of proof made by the defend-
ant. If the court finds that the evidence elicited at the hearing and pro-
posed to be offered by the defendant is relevant pursuant to section 780
(general rules as 'to credibility), and is not inadmissible pursuant to
Evidence Code Section 352 (authority of judge to exclude unduly
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time consuming, prejudicial, or confusing evidence), the court may
make an order stating what evidence may be introduced by the de-
fendant and the nature of the questions to be permitted. Hence, unless
the defendant first proves to the court that the evidence proposed to be
introduced is relevant to the alleged victim's credibility, and thereafter
adheres to the limitations imposed by the court on the questions which
may be asked and the type of evidence which may be introduced, the
defendant will be unable to introduce any evidence of the witness' prior
sexual conduct in nearly all cases.
Consent
Section 1103 of the Evidence Code relates to the admissibility of
evidence concerning -a character -trait of the victim of a crime. Chapter
569 has amended section 1103 to provide that in any prosecution for
the above-mentioned crimes, opinion evidence, reputation evidence,
and evidence of specific instances of the complaining witness' prior
sexual conduct are not admissible by the defendant to prove that the
complaining witness consented to engage in sexual intercourse with the
defendant. Such evidence is, however, admissible by the defendant to
prove consent when (1) the evidence is of the complaining witness'
prior sexual conduct with the defendant, or (2) the prosecutor intro-
duces any evidence relating to the complaining witness' prior sexual
conduct, in which case the defendant may cross-examine the witness
who gives such testimony and offer relevant evidence limited to the
purpose of rebutting the evidence introduced by the prosecution. Evi-
dence admissible pursuant to section 780, relating to the credibility of
the victim, is not made inadmissible by section 1103.
Chapter 1093 has added section 1127d to the Evidence Code to pro-
hibit judges from instructing juries that they may infer that a female
who has previously consented to acts of sexual intercourse with persons
other than the defendant would therefore be more likely to consent to
sexual intercourse again. Section 1127d prohibits such instructions
in any trial for rape, unlawful sexual intercourse, or for attempt to
commit, or assault with intent to commit such crimes. Judges are also
prohibited from instructing juries that evidence of previous acts of sex-
ual conduct by the victim may be considered by itself in judging the
credibility of the witness.
Medical Examinations
Chapter 1091 has added section 13961.5 to the Government Code
to prohibit any hospital or other emergency facility, either public or
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private, from charging for the examination of a victim of a sexual as-
sault when the examination is for the purpose of gathering evidence
for possible prosecution. Such costs, in the case of a county, city, or
district hospital, must be paid by the county, and in the case of a private
hospital must be paid by the local governmental agency in the jurisdic-
,tion where the alleged offense occurred.
COMMENT
The effect of chapter 569 will be to overturn existing California
case law. California courts have consistently held that evidence of a
woman's previous sexual conduct is germane to the issue of whether or
not ,the victim consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant, and
that questions relating to such conduct are permissible. [See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Walker, 150 Cal. App. 2d 594, 310 P.2d 110 (1957)]. More-
over, California courts have demonstrated a willingness to go far in
ruling evidence relevant in sex offense cases when the issue of consent
is contested [See In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96
Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971) (failure of prosecuting attorney to disclose to
rape defendant that husband of mentally disturbed prosecutrix had
been hospitalized as a sex degenerate is reversible error)]. Although
the decisions characterizing such evidence as relevant are now super-
seded, the issue remains whether such questions may be asked by the
defendant as a matter of constitutional right. Evidence Code Section
210 defines "relevant evidence' as evidence, including evidence rele-
vant to the credibility of a witness, having any tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the action.
Section 351 stipulates that except as otherwise provided by statute,
all relevant evidence is admissible. The issue which may be raised,
therefore, is whether the limitations now imposed by section 1103 are
the result of a proper exercise of the legislature's power to define what
evidence is relevant, or whether seotion 1103 is a constitutionally
impermissible limitation on a rape defendant's sixth amendment right
to confront adverse witnesses.
In Pointer v. Texas [380 U.S. 400 (1965)] the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right
to confront witnesses includes the right to cross-examine them, that such
right is a fundamental right of criminal defendants, and that defend-
ants in state prosecutions enjoy this right via the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In Davis v. Alaska [94 S. Ct. 1105
(1974)] the Court held that a statute which prohibits 'a criminal de-
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fendant from cross-examining a juvenile witness about the juvenile's
criminal record violates due process. In Davis a critical link in the
prosecutor's case against a burglary defendant was the testimony of a
minor who previously had been convicted of a burglary. Under Alaska
law, evidence of the prior conviction of a juvenile could not be intro-
duced in adult proceedings except in presentencing hearings. Hence,
when the defense attorney attempted to cross-examine the witness about
his juvenile conviction for the purpose of showing that the witness, as
a person who had himself been convicted of burglary and placed on
probation, "might have been subject to undue pressure from the police
and made his identifications under fear of possible probation revoca-
tion," [94 S. Ct. at 1108] the trial court sustained the prosecutor's
objection that such questioning should be prohibited. In reversing the
conviction the United States Supreme Court stated that the state's pol-
icy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's
record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as
cross-examination designed to probe for bias on the part of an adverse
witness. The Court concluded that the juvenile's potential bias war-
ranted cross-examination into his penal history, and that the minor's
right to have his past remain a secret "is outweighed by petitioner's
right to probe into the influence of possible bias on the testimony of a
crucial identification witness." [94S. Ct. at 1112].
Davis implies that evidence of a witness' prior criminal conduct is
constitutionally relevant to the issue of credibility, which is central to
the purpose of cross-examination. Questions which are designed to
disprove an element of the crime (e.g., consent) with which the de-
fendant is charged are also central to the purpose of cross-examination.
Therefore, the issue is whether evidence of -a witness' prior sexual con-
duct is constitutionally relevant to the issue of consent. It would ap-
pear that there are sound reasons for distinguishing between Davis-type
cases and rape trials, and that the legislature's determination of what
evidence is relevant at rape trials is a constitutionally permissible one.
The rationale for this conclusion is that evidence of prior criminal con-
duct is a more valid reason for rejecting -the credibility of a witness than
is evidence of prior sexual conduct. In short, one kind of evidence
is of much greater relevance to the issue at hand than is the other.
Davis would thus seem to fall short of providing a constitutional argu-
ment against limiting questions on past sexual conduct. Furthermore,
if as in Davis, the defendant desires to cast doubt on the credibility of
the complaining witness, section 752 expressly permits the credibility
of such witness to be tested under the strict control of the court.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 6
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Cross-examination of a rape victim has typically been used to prove
the defendant's contentions that the alleged victim consented to engag-
ing in sexual intercourse with the defendant. This consent, according
to prior law, could be inferred on the principle that a woman who had
once consented to such an act would be more ,ikely to consent again,
and that therefore the defendant did not impose himself upon the al-
leged victim by force. To put the argument in the format of Evidence
Code Section 210, evidence of the fact that an alleged rape victim had
previously consented to engaging in an act of sexual intercourse "tended
in reason" to prove a "disputed fact that is of consequence to the ac-
tion." Chapter 569, however, is clearly a legislative rejection of the no-
tion that the fact that a woman has previously consented to sexual in-
tercourse leads to the conclusion that it is more likely that she con-
sented to an act of sexual intercourse with the particular defendant on
a particular occasion. Chapter 569 expresses the legislature's senti-
ment that evidence of a woman's prior sexual conduct is simply not rele-
vant to the issue of her consent on a given occasion. It is strongly
arguable, therefore, that chapter 569 is a proper exercise of the legis-
lature's power under section 351 to make such evidence inadmissible.
Furthermore, to the extent that chapter 569 does limit a defendant's
right of cross-examination, such a limitation could be balanced against
(1) the victim's right to privacy, a right expressly enjoyed in common
with all Californians (CAL. CONST. art. I, §1]; and (2) the state's in-
terest in encouraging victims of serious crimes to testify against the
perpetrators of such crimes.
A further objection to chapter 569 is that it might not, in some cases,
work to achieve its purpose of .limiting the admissibility of evidence re-
lating to a woman's prior sexual conduct. This is because section 782,
unlike section 1103, relates not to the issue of whether the alleged vic-
tim consented to engaging in sexual intercourse with the defendant but
to the credibility of the victim. Since the procedures enacted by sec-
tion 782 may in some cases permit the trier of fact to hear evidence of
the victim's sexual conduct under the procedures delineated above and
for the purpose of determining credibility, section 782 has the effect of
permitting the trier of fact to hear the same evidence which section 1103
(relating to consent) will normally serve to exclude. Whether it is
realistic to expect the trier of fact to be able to ignore, for purposes of
determining consent, the same evidence it hears for purposes of deter-
mining the victim's credibility, seems questionable. Perhaps it was in
anticipation of this problem that the legislature added section 1127d
to the Evidence Code -to prohibit judges from instructing juries that
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evidence of a woman's prior sexual conduct may be considered in de-
termining the complaining witness' credibility. Previously, rape trial
juries were customarily instructed that evidence that the complaining
witness was a woman of "unchaste character" could be considered in
judging her credibility [CALJIC No. 10.06]. Hence, although section
782 of the Evidence Code expressly permits the credibility of a com-
plaining witness to be attacked by introducing evidence of her prior
sexual conduct, section 1127d prohibits the jury from being instructed
that such evidence may indeed be considered by them in judging the
witness' credibility. The net effect of these changes is that the jury
may hear and consider such evidence in judging the truthfulness of the
alleged victim, but the judge may not affirmatively direct their attention
in his instructions -to that particular evidence. Pursuant to section
1127d therefore, it appears that the trial judge in rape and related of-
fense cases may only give instructions on the issue of the witness' cred-
ibility which do not refer to the sexual conduct of the complaining
witness [See, e.g., CALJIC Nos. 2.20-2.26].
Crininal Procedure; rape trials
Evidence Code § 1 127e (new).
AB 3658 (Sieroty); STATS 1974, Ch 1092
Prior to the enactment of chapter 1092, California judges instructed
juries in rape trials on the importance of evidence which tended to
demonstrate the "unchaste character" of the alleged victim (CALJIC
Nos. 10.06, 10.13, 10.67). CALJIC No. 10.06, for example, states:
"A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape
but it may be inferred that a woman who has previously consented to
sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent again." Chapter
1092 has been enacted to add section 1127e to the Evidence Code to
provide that the term "unchaste character" may not be used in any in-
struction given to the jury in rape and unlawful sexual intercourse
trials, or at any trial for attempt to commit, or for assault with intent
to commit, such crimes.
COMMENT
Section 1127e raises a number of unanswered questions. Because
section 1127e only specifically prohibits the use of the term "unchaste
character" in jury instructions, it might appear that a different phrase
with a similar meaning could be substituted in its place. Any such
Pacific Lav Journal Vol. 6
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attempt at circumventing the purpose of the statute, however, would
arguably run afoul of the general rule of statutory construction that
statutes are to be construed so as to give effect to the intent of the
legislature. It is not clear from the language of chapter 1092 whether
the intent of the legislature in enacting section 1127e was to prohibit
the use of any jury instruction which refers to the victim's prior sexual
history.
Criminal Procedure; voir dire examination of jurors
Penal Code §1078 (amended).
AB 279 (Crown); STATS 1974, Ch 960
Support: State Bar of California; District Attorneys of California
Opposition: Attorney General
Chapter 960 has amended section 1078 of the Penal Code to ex-
pressly stipulate that voir dire examination of prospective jurors in crim-
inal cases shall be conducted orally and directly by counsel. Section
1078 formerly provided that counsel must be given the opportunity to
reasonably examine veniremen, but did not expressly provide for direct
examination of prospective jurors by counsel. In People v. Crowe
[8 Cal. 3d 815, 506 P.2d 193, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973)] the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court held that section 1078 did not require the trial
court to permit direct examination by counsel and concluded that per-
mitting counsel to submit questions to the judge, who then asked pro-
spective jurors the questions which the judge found to be relevant, met
the statutory requirement of section 1078. The effect of chapter 960,
therefore, is to supersede the decision in Crowe and to give counsel the
automatic right to examine prospective jurors.
COMMENT
Penal Code Section 1078, in addition to permitting counsel to ex-
amine veniremen, makes it the duty of the trial court to examine the
prospective jurors to select a fair and impartial jury. This dual aspect
of section 1078 (examination of veniremen by counsel and examination
by the court) has resulted in a series of court cases which have tried
to resolve the conflict arising out of the judge's duty to select a fair jury
and the attempts by some counsel to use voir dire to select a jury favor-
able to their client. In Crowe the court noted that in the past it had
found it necessary to admonish ,trial judges that they had been
placing too literal an interpretation upon the duty of the -trial court,
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and paying too little attention to the right of counsel. The subse-
quent exploitation of the voir dire for partisan advantage has re-
versed the situation: it is now time -to stress that counsel's right is
only to a reasonable examination of prospective jurors-reasonable
in length, in method, in purpose, and in content.
The court found that "direct examination by counsel has perverted
the purpose of voir dire, and transformed the examination of jurors into
a contest between counsel for the selection of a jury partial to his cause
and for the attainment of rapport with the jurors so selected, a contest
which may overshadow the actual trial on the merits." [8 Cal. 3d 815,
828, 506 P.2d 193, 202, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (1973)].
If it is true that direct examination of veniremen by counsel prevents
or inhibits the selection of an impartial jury, then section 1078 works
at cross-purposes: if direct voir dire examination works to select a par-
tial jury, then the trial judge will be unable to select a fair and impar-
tial jury. Hence, an issue exists as to whether a judicial interpretation
of this conflict can be made which will save the statute, or whether it
will be invalidated in toto. However, section 1078 appears to be cap-
able of a harmonious interpretation. Section 1078 expressly makes it
the duty of the trial court judge to select a jury which is fair and im-
partial. It would appear, then, that if the examination of prospective
jurors becomes a contest for the selection of a jury favorable to one side,
then the trial court judge could properly prohibit such questioning as
being unreasonable in purpose. Although chapter 960 does regulate
who may conduct voir dire examination, it does not affect either the
manner or the purpose of conducting such examination. Presumably,
existing case law which defines .the parameters of "reasonable examina-
tion' would then continue in effect.
See Generally:
1) Lamp Chimney Co. v. Brass & Copper Co., 91 U.S. 656, 663 (1875) (resolution
of conflicts arising from contradictory provisions of same statute).
2) 4 WrrnuN, CALIFORNI PROCEDURE, Trial §§111-120 (2d ed. 1971).
3) WITMN, CALIFORNTA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial §§406-407 (1963).
4) Comment, The Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A Constitutional Right,
39 BRooKLYN L. REv. 290 (1972).
5) Goodman, Should California Adopt Federal Civil Procedure?, 40 CAL. L. REv.
184 (1952).
Criminal procedure; extradition expenses
Penal Code §1557 (repealed); §1557 (new).
AB 2697 (Dixon); STATS 1974, Ch 998
Support: California District Attorneys' 'and Peace Officers' Associa-
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 6
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tion; County Supervisors' Association of California
Opposition: Department of Corrections
This chapter expands the types of extradition expenses for which
local governments may be reimbursed by the state. Section 1557 of the
Penal Code provides that the state, upon approval of the Governor,
will pay those expenses incurred 'by a local government in producing
witnesses and evidence in a sister state if, without such witnesses or evi-
dence, the sister state will not surrender the fugitive. Section 1557 also
permits the Governor, in unusual cases, to authorize payment of the ex-
penses of producing witnesses to appear in a sister state on behalf of
the fugitive in opposition to his extradition, provided that the appear-
ance of such witnesses has been authorized in advance by the Governor.
Under previous law the state would pay only (1) travel expenses of the
employee who was to return the fugitive, (2) statutory fees paid to the
sister state for the detention and surrender of the fugitive, and (3)
money paid to the authorities of the sister state for the fugitive's sub-
sistence while detained. Now the state will pay these expenses as well
as the costs of producing witnesses upon the approval of the Governor.
Under the previous law there was no requirement for the Governor's
approval before the local government could be reimbursed by the
state. However, since extradition is only possible when the Governor
demands, on behalf of the local jurisdiction, the rendition of the fugi-
tive, to additionally require the approval of the Governor -for extradi-
tion expenditures appears to create a procedurally unnecessary step.
Also, under previous law the extradition expenses were not charge-
able to the state if the fugitive was not arraigned or brought to trial.
Instead it remained a charge upon the jurisdiction which sought the fu-
gitive. However, chapter 998 does not include such a provision and
the state must now reimburse local governments for extradition ex-
penses whether or not the fugitive is arraigned or brought to trial.
Payments to local agencies are to be made in ,accordance with the rules
of the Board of Control.
Criminal Procedure; arraignment
Penal Code §976 (amended).
AB 4421 (Dixon); STATS 1974, Ch 881
Prior to the enactment of chapter 881, a criminal defendant could
be arraigned only before the court in which the accusatory pleading
was filed. As amended, section 976 of the Penal Code now provides
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that in counties having a population exceeding 4,000,000, a criminal
defendant who is to be arraigned in a municipal court and is in custody
may be arraigned before any municipal court within the county nearest
to the place in which he is being held. Prior to being taken to the
place of arraignment, the defendant is also allowed to make three tele-
phone calls in addition to any other calls to which he is entitled by law.
This new legislation will apply solely to the County of Los Angeles,
and in such a populous county the effect is primarily one of conven-
ience in conducting the judicial process.
Criminal Procedure; written not guilty pleas
Vehicle Code §40519 (amended).
SB 2295 (Song); STATS 1974, Ch 1264
Vehicle Code Section 40519 formerly allowed persons who had re-
ceived notice to appear on an nfraction in a court outside the county
of their residence to plead not guilty in writing in lieu of appearing
in person. Section 40519 has been amended by chapter 1264 to ex-
tend this privilege to persons receiving notice to appear for an infrac-
tion in any court. Chapter 1264 also provides that, effective January
1, 1976, such notice must carry a written message on the back, inform-
ing the recipient of the provisions of this section. An infraction is any
offense not punishable by imprisonment [CAL. PEN. CODE §19c]
and most commonly denotes a violation of the Vehicle Code [Cf.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE §40000.1].
Criminal Procedure; own recognizance releases
Penal Code §§1318.4, 1318.6 (amended).
AB 2364 (Vasconcellos); STATS 1974, Ch 202
Support: State Bar of California; California Trial Lawyers' Associ-
ation
Penal Code Section 1318.6 formerly provided that a criminal defend-
ant who had been released on his own recognizance could thereafter
be required to post bond or be returned to custody. Chapter 202 has
been enacted to provide that a defendant who has been released on his
own recognizance may be returned to custody only after an open, in-
court determination has been made that conditions have occurred which
justify such action. Specifically, section 1318.6 now provides that the
court in which the charges against the defendant are pending may re-
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quire the defendant to give either bail or other security when that court
makes an open determination that the defendant has failed to appear
or has violated any condition of the release, or that there has been a
change in circumstances increasing the risk that the defendant will
fail to appear, or that 'additional facts have been presented which were
not shown at the time of the order releasing the defendant. The court
may order that the defendant be committed to actual custody until he
gives such bail or security. Prior to amendment there was no require-
ment of an open, in-court determination that the order releasing the de-
fendant should be revoked or modified, nor was the revoking judge or
magistrate limited to the conditions now set forth in section 1318.6 as
grounds for revoking the order releasing the defendant on his own rec-
ognizance. The section does not require that notice of the in-court de-
termination be given to the defendant.
Section 1318.4 of the Penal Code has been amended to require a de-
fendant seeking to be released on his own recognizance to file with the
clerk of the court a signed statement agreeing that the order of release
may be revoked, or bail or other security required, by any court of
competent jurisdiction upon a finding made in open court that any of
the conditions specified in section 1318.6 have occurred.
See Generally:
1) Comment, Trends in Own Recognizance Release: From Manhattan to California,
5 PAC. L.J. 675 (1974).
Criminal Procedure; payment of appointed counsel fees
Penal Code §9 87.8 (amended).
SB 1546 (Biddle); STATS 1974, Ch 1199
(Effective September 24, 1974)
Section 987.8 of the Penal Code formerly provided for a hearing to
be held at the end of the trial of a criminal defendant to whom appointed
counsel had been furnished, in order to determine his ability to pay for
a part or all of his defense. If the court determined that the defendant
could bear some or all of such costs an order of repayment was issued
which had the same force and effect as a civil judgment. Section
987.8 was ruled unconstitutional in People v. Amor [35 Cal. App. 3d
344, 110 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1973)] as being violative of due process in
that it did not require the trial court to give notice to the defendant
that (1) by accepting court appointed counsel he could become liable
for the entire cost of his defense, (2) that a hearing to determine his
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ability to pay the cost of his defense would be held after trial, and (3)
that the repayment order would have the full force and effect of a civil
judgment. Chapter 1199 amends section 987.8 to require the trial
court, prior to furnishing counsel for a defendant, to notify him of the
post-trial hearing, his liability if he is able to repay some or all of the
defense costs, and the effect of the repayment order. The court in
Amor suggested that such notice would satisfy the requirements of due
process [35 Cal. App. 3d at 347, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 703]. In addition,
chapter 1199 requires that the defendant shall be entitled to have the
opportunity to be heard in person, to present witnesses and other docu-
mentary evidence, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 'to have dis-
closed to him the evidence of his ability to pay, and to receive a written
statement of the findings of the court.
COMMENT
The court in Amor hinted that section 987.8 might be constitution-
ally infirm on grounds other than due process, but did not delineate
those grounds. The California Supreme Court in In re Allen [71 Cal.
2d 388, 455 P.2d 143, 78 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1969)] held that a trial
court judge could not require a defendant to repay the cost of his ap-
pointed counsel as a condition of receiving probation. Reasoning that
defendants would forego the assistance of counsel rather than face the
prospect of paying attorneys' fees, the court concluded that condition-
ing the granting of probation upon repayment of appointed counsels'
fees constituted an unconstitutional impediment to the free exercise of
the right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. A similar
statute enacted in Kansas [KAN. STAT. ANN. §22-4513 (Supp. 1970)]
was ruled unconstitutional in Strange v. James [323 F. Supp. 1230
(D. Kan. 1974)], the court reasoning that persons fearful of being
forced to repay defense costs would waive the right to be represented
by appointed counsel. This was held to be an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the right to counsel [323 F. Supp. at 1233]. Furthermore,
not all criminal defendants can refuse to be represented by counsel
even when such assistance is not desired by the defendant [See, e.g.,
People v. Rhinehart, 9 Cal. 3d 139, 507 P.2d 642, 107 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1973) (youth incapable of defending himself could not refuse ap-
pointed counsel)]. Under chapter 1199, therefore, some defendants
not seeking -the assistance of counsel will be required to accept and pay
for such -assistance if able to do so.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 6
Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; mentally disordered persons
Penal Code §4011.6 (amended).
SB 607 (Petris); STATS 1974, Ch 22
Support: Municipal Court, Berkeley-Albany Judicial District
Section 4011.6 of the Penal Code provides that the person in charge
of a city or county jail, or any judge in the county in which the jail is
located, may remand any person in custody in such jail to a facility for
a 72-hour period of treatment and evaluation pursuant to section 5150
of the Welfare and Institutions Code (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act)
when it appears to such person in charge, or judge, that the person in
custody may be mentally disordered. Once such a person is remanded
to, or detained in, such a facility, specified provisions of the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act shall apply to the prisoner. The Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act provisons relate to (1) the detention of mentally disordered
persons for evaluation and treatment, (2) certification for intensive
treatment, (3) additional intensive treatment for suicidal persons, (4)
post-certification procedures for imminently dangerous persons, and
(5) the legal and civil rights of persons involuntarily confined [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §5150 et seq.]. Section 4011.6 has been
amended to require the remanding authority to supply to the facility
information setting forth the reasons such person is being taken to the
facility. It further requires the treating facility to transmit a confiden-
tial report to the remanding authority concerning the condition of the
prisoner. A new report shall be transmitted at the end of each period
of confinement authorized by the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act.
See Generally:
1) Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III in California: The Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 93 (1974).
2) 3 PAC. L.J., REvIEw oF SELECTED 1971 CAUFORN, LEGISLATON 330 (1972).
Criminal Procedure; commitment of mentally
incompetent criminal defendants
Penal Code §§977.1, 1368.1, 1370.2, 1375.5 (new) ; §§1026, 1026a,
1367, 1368, 1369, 1370, 1372, 1373, 1374 (amended); Welfare
and Institutions Code §§5369, 5370 (new); §§5008, 7250
(amended).
AB 1529 (Murphy); STATS 1974, Ch 1511
SB 2249 (Grunsky); STATS 1974, Ch 1423
(Effective September 28, 1974)
Support: Attorney General; California Public Defenders' Associa-
,ion
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Redefines those unable to stand trial as mentally incompetent
rather than insane; requires a trial on the issue of the mental
competence of certain defendants; delineates the procedures to be
followed when a defendant is adjudged mentally incompetent; re-
quires periodic reports from he superintendent of the facility to
which the defendant is committed; provides for the return to court
of committed defendants and their release from custody under
certain circumstances; provides that committed defendants may be
treated on an out-patient basis; permits defendants defined as
"gravely disabled" to be civilly committed to mental health treat-
ment facilities.
The Penal Code formerly permitted criminal defendants who had
been found to be "presently insane" (i.e., insane at the time they ap-
peared before a court) to be committed indefinitely to state mental
hospitals (former Penal Code §1367 et seq.). In Jackson v. Indiana
[406 U.S. 715 (1972)] the United States Supreme Court held that a
similar commitment scheme denied such defendants equal protection of
the laws and violated due process. The Court held that the Indiana
statute was violative of equal protection because it subjected criminal
defendants to commitment standards more lenient, and release stand-
ards more stringent, than the standards generally applicable to persons
committed under Indiana's civil commitment scheme. The result of
such a scheme, said the Court, was to condemn persons against whom
charges were made, but not yet proved, to permanent institutionaliza-
tion without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity
for release afforded by ordinary civil commitment procedures. The
Court also held that the Indiana scheme violated due process and ruled
that a defendant committed under it may not be held more than the
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a sub-
stantial probability that he will attain competency in the near future.
If his return to competency in the near future is not foreseeable, the
Court stated, then the defendant must either be released or committed
pursuant to civil proceedings applicable to those not charged with
crimes.
In In re Davis [8 Cal. 3d 798, 505 P.2d 1018, 106 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1973)] the California Supreme Court adopted the rule of Jack-
son and held that when there is no reasonable likelihood that a defend-
ant will return to competency to stand trial in the foreseeable future, he
must either be released or commitment proceedings should be initiated
against him pursuant to the California civil commitment scheme [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE pt. 1 (commencing with §5000)]. Chapter 1511
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is expressly stated as being the legislative response to the Davis hold-
ing and is designed to bring California's criminal commitment proce-
dure into conformity with the guidelines laid out in Jackson and Davis.
Precommitment Procedures
Chapter 1511 initially delineates the procedures to be followed in
committing mentally incompetent defendants to mental health treatment
facilities. Specifically, amended section 1367 provides that a person
may not be tried or sentenced while he is mentally incompetent. Sec-
tion 1367 formerly used the term "insane" in place of the new phrase
"mentally incompetent." But the definition of both terms is the same.
A person is "insane" or "mentally incompetent" when, as a result of a
mental disorder, he is unable to understand the nature of the proceed-
ings against him, and to rationally assist counsel in the conduct of a
defense [CAL. PEN. CODE §13671'. Section 1368 has been amended
by chapter 1511 to delineate the procedures by which a trial on
the issue of the defendant's competency may be conducted. Specifi-
cally, section 1368 provides that when a doubt arises as to the mental
competence of the defendent, the court shall state that doubt on the
record and, upon its own or defense counsel's motion, shall recess the
proceedings for a reasonable time to permit the defendant's counsel
to form an opinion as to his client's competency to stand trial. If coun-
sel believes that the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, then
the question of the defendant's competence shall be determined at a
special hearing. Even if counsel believes that the defendant is compe-
tent, the court may nevertheless order such a hearing on its own mo-
tion. All such hearings shall be in the superior court, and except as
provided in section 1368.1 (discussed infra), all criminal proceedings
shall cease until the conclusion of such hearings. Section 1368 form-
erly required a court which doubted the present sanity of a criminal
defendant to hold a trial on the issue of sanity before any further crim-
inal proceedings could be conducted.
Section 1368.1 has been added to the Penal Code to provide addi-
tional assurance that criminal defendants will not be committed to state
mental health facilities needlessly. Specifically, section 1368.1 has
been added to the Penal Code to provide that when the charge against
the defendant is a felony, the competency hearing may not be held un-
til after filing of the indictment or information. This provision will
eliminate the occasional case where a defendant, not yet indicted, could
be placed in a mental institution [Comment, Incompetency to Stand
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Trial, 81 HARv. L. REv. 454, 468 (1967)]. A demurrer or a mo-
tion to dismiss pursuant to sections 995 (insufficiency of indictment
or information) or 1538.5 (motion to return property or suppress evi-
dence) may be made at any time. If the charge is a misdemeanor, the
defense may demur or move to dismiss on the ground that there is not
probable cause to believe that a public offense has been committed and
that the defendant is guilty thereof, or make a motion under section
1538.5. In ruling upon such a motion or demurrer the court may, if
necessary, hear any matter of law or fact which is capable of fair de-
termination in the absence of the defendant (§977.1). This will per-
mit defendants who are unable to render assistance to their counsel in
preparation of their defense to be released when the charges leveled
against them are not brought in conformity with proper procedure.
Such motions or demurrers, if originated in the municipal or justice
court, must be made in the court having jurisdiction over the misde-
meanor complaint before a competency hearing is held in the superior
court. If the information or indictment has been filed, then the com-
petency hearing will proceed pursuant to section 1369.
Section 1369 formerly delineated the procedures pursuant to which
a trial on the issue of the defendant's sanity was conducted. This sec-
tion has been amended to outline the procedures to be followed at the
competency hearing. The defendant shall be entitled to have the issue
of his competency tried by the court or a jury. The court shall first
appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist and other appropriate
experts to examine the defendant. If the defendant is not seeking a
finding of incompetence, two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists or a
combination thereof shall be appointed, one named by the defendant
and one by the prosecution. The party contending that the defendant
is mentally incompetent shall first introduce evidence. Each party then
may introduce rebuttal evidence and deliver final arguments. The de-
fendant shall be presumed -to be competent unless proven otherwise by
a preponderance of the evidence. A jury verdict finding the defendant
to be mentally incompetent must be unanimous. Although section
1369 formerly provided for a jury trial on the issue of the defendant's
sanity, it did not provide for the appointment of psychiatrists to ex-
amine the defendant.
Commitment of Criminal Defendants
Section 1370 formerly described the procedures to be followed after
the sanity trial had been conducted. If the defendant was found sane,
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the trial proceeded or judgment was imposed. If, however, the defend-
ant was found to be insane, the trial or imposition of sentence was sus-
pended until the defendant regained his sanity. Until such time, the
defendant was placed in a state mental hospital. It was this provision
for indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant which was the basis
of the holdings in Jackson and Davis. As amended, section 1370 in-
sures that defendants found to be mentally incompetent to be tried or
sentenced and thereafter placed in mental hospitals will not remain so
confined indefinitely. When a defendant is adjudged as incompetent,
he shall be placed in any available public or private facility which will
promote his restoration to sanity until such time as his competency is
restored. Within 90 days of a commitment made pursuant to this
section, the superintendent of the facility to which the defendant has
been committed shall prepare a written report concerning the defend-
ant's progress toward restoration of his mental competence and deliver
such report to the court. If the report indicates a substantial likelihood
that the defendant will regain his mental competence in the foreseeable
future, he will remain in the treatment facility.
Section 1375.5 has been added to provide that time spent by the de-
fendant in a treatment facility or time spent as an outpatient shall be
credited to any term of imprisonment to which the defendant is sen-
tenced in a criminal trial which was suspended under section 1370.
Prior to enactment of chapter 1511, no such statutory provision existed
to credit the time a defendant spent in a mental hospital against any
sentence eventually imposed. Copies of the progress report shall also
be given to the defendant and others designated by him. Such reports
shall be made at six month intervals or until the defendant becomes
mentally competent. If the report indicates that there is no substantial
likelihood that the defendant will regain his mental competence in the
foreseeable future, the court shall order that he be returned to the court
where he will be released or committed under the civil procedures of the
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5000 et seq.].
Under Penal Code Section 1370 a defendant who has been committed
to a mental health treatment facility pursuant to section 1370(a) but
who is, according to a determination of the court, receiving no treat-
ment for his mental impairment, must be returned to the committing
court. There is, however, no provision contained in chapter 1511 as
to what is to be done with such defendants returned to the court. It is
possible that such persons may be redirected to another treatment facil-
ity, but chapter 1511 does not supply a clear answer.
Selected 1974 California Legislation
Criminal Procedure
Termination of Criminal Commitment
A defendant who is still hospitalized after 18 months shall be
returned to the court for a second competency trial held pursuant to
section 1369 (§1370(b)(2)). If the defendant who is so returned
appears to the court to be "gravely disabled" as defined in section
5008 (h) (2) of the Welfare and Institutions Code (discussed infra),
the court shall order the conservatorship investigator of the county of
commitment to initiate conservatorship proceedings for him. Section
1370 further provides that a defendant who has not yet regained his
mental competence at the end of three years from the date of commit-
ment, or a period of commitment equal to the maximum term of in-
carceration for the most serious offense with which the defendant is
charged (whichever is sooner), shall be returned to the committing
court. This provision of section 1370 appears inconsistent with sec-
tion 1370(b) (2), which provides for the return of defendants at the
end of eighteen months rather than after three years. However, this
apparent inconsistency is reconcilable by reference to section 1374.
Section 1374 has been amended to provide that when the superintend-
ent of the facility to which the defendant has been committed believes
that the defendant is not a menace to others, he may allow the defend-
ant to be treated as an outpatient after giving 15 days notice to the
district attorney and after court approval. A defendant who has been
confined less than 18 months, but who is being treated on an out-
patient basis, will be returned to the court three years after commitment.
Whenever any defendant who appears to the court to be gravely dis-
abled (discussed infra) is so returned, or is returned after 18
months of commitment after a second incompetency trial, the court
shall order the conservatorship investigator of the county to initiate
conservatorship proceedings for such defendant pursuant to chapter
3 (commencing with §5350) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Any hearing held pursuant to such conservatorship proceedings shall
be held in the superior court of the committing county.
Chapter 1423 has amended sections 1026 and 1026a of the Penal
Code, as well as section 7250 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, to
require that when an application for release from a state mental hos-
pital is made to the superior court of the county in which the inmate
is confined, all documents requested by such court shall be forwarded
to that court from the county of commitment. Presumably this will
enable the court to more effectively deal with applications for release
by making available to the court more relevant information than was
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available previously. Before the enactment of chapter 1423, there
was no requirement that such information be forwarded.
Dismissal of Pending Criminal Charges
Criminal charges pending against a committed defendant remain sub-
ject to dismissal pursuant to Penal Code Section 1385 (dismissal in
furtherance of justice), and if dismissed the defendant shall be released
from any commitment imposed pursuant to this chapter, but without
prejudice to the initiation of civil proceedings under the Lanterman-
Petris-Short Act (discussed infra). Section 1370.2, as added to the
Penal Code, provides that any misdemeanor charges pending against
a person adjudged mentally incompetent may be dismissed, provided
that 10 days notice of any motion to dismiss is given to the district at-
torney. When conservatorship proceedings have been initiated and
criminal charges are still pending against a defendant, Penal Code
Section 1372, as amended, requires the conservator of a person who
has regained his mental competency to certify such fact to the court,
sheriff, district attorney, and counsel for the defense. Within two ju-
dicial days the court shall conduct 'a hearing to determine if release
should be granted pending conclusion of the proceedings.
Civil Commitment of Mentally Incompetent Defendants
Once defendants have been returned to the committing court pursu-
ant to section 1370, chapter 1511 provides a detailed procedure
whereby they may be civilly committed to mental health treatment fa-
cilities pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. Under Welfare
and Institutions Code Article 1 (commencing with §5150), Article 2
(commencing with §5200), Article 4 (commencing with §5250), and
Chapter 3 (commencing with §5350), a conservator may be appointed
for "gravely disabled" persons. Such persons are defined as those un-
able to care for their person or their basic needs [CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §5008(h)]. Section 5008 has been amended to include
within the definition of "gravely disabled" those persons who are found
to be incompetent under Penal Code Section 1370 and against whom
the criminal charge is a felony involving death, great bodily harm, or a
serious threat to the physical well-being of another. Under chapter
1511, therefore, civil conservatorship proceedings may be initiated for
those charged with violations of the type discussed above.
When a defendant who has been returned to the committing court
pursuant to section 1370 of the Penal Code does not have charges
pending against him related to death, or serious bodily injury or threat
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thereof, it appears that certain provisions of the Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act may be utilized to civilly confine the defendant for 107 days
if the court or jury finds that the defendant (1) as a result of a men-
tal disorder, is a danger to himself or to others; and (2) has threatened
or harmed someone. In special circumstances, the conservatee may be
detained for up to 90 additional days [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§5150, 5250, 5300]. This procedure is identical to the one ordinar-
ily employed to civilly commit nondefendants. Such defendants will
be detained in mental health treatment facilities for a little more than
six months, at most, even though they are not mentally competent to
stand trial or be sentenced.
Section 5370 has been added to permit the initiation of conservator-
ship proceedings against any person who has been charged, regardless
of whether action is pending or has been initiated pursuant to section
1370 of the Penal Code. Section 5369 has been added to require the
conservator of a person who has criminal charges pending against him
and who has been found mentally incompetent under Penal Code Sec-
tion 1370, to notify the court, sheriff, and district attorney of the com-
mitting county, and the defendant's attorney, when and if the defendant
returns to competency. In such cases the court shall order the return
of the defendant to the court in which criminal charges are pending.
Criminal Procedure; release of mentally disordered persons
Welfare and Institutions Code §7375 (amended).
AB 1291 (Keene); STATS 1974, Ch 326
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 7375 provides procedures
for the release from state hospitals and redelivery to law enforcement
authorities of mentally disordered defendants and criminals who have
recovered from their infirmities. Prior to the enactment of chapter
326, there was no requirement that an open-court hearing be held on
the issue of paroling inmates from mental health treatment facilities.
Chapter 326 has amended section 7375 to provide that persons com-
mitted to a state hospital pursuant to section 1026 of the Penal Code
(defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity) may be released
therefrom, once the statutorily prescribed minimum period of confine-
ment has passed, pursuant to the following procedure: (1) The med-
ical director of the hospital must certify to the committing court his
opinion that the person has improved to such an extent that he is no
longer a danger to the health and safety of others, and that the person
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will benefit from release on parole; and (2) within 30 days after re-
ceiving the director's opinion, and after giving notice to the prosecut-
ing attorney, the court shall conduct an open hearing to approve or dis-
approve the recommendation of the director.
If parole is granted, it may include release of the person to the cus-
tody of the local mental health facility for one or more periods of up to
30 days each in order to facilitate the person's readjustment to the
community pending a determination with regard to his restoration to
sanity. If the recommendation is disapproved, subsequent recommen-
dations may be made by the director after six months have lapsed.
Previously, such subsequent recommendations could not be made until
one year had passed from the date of the previous hearing.
COMMENT
Chapter 326 is unclear as to the question of how the open-court
hearing on the prisoner's release on parole is to be conducted. It ap-
pears that such hearings are analogous to parole release hearings, ex-
cept that the prisoner dealt with under chapter 326 is confined in a
mental health treatment facility rather than in a state prison. In In re
Sturm [11 Cal. 3d 258, 521 P.2d 97, 113 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1974)],
the California Supreme Court dealt with the question of what proce-
dural due process guarantees are required in a parole release hearing,
and held that whether a particular procedure in a parole release hearing
violates due process depends upon (1) the objectives of the challenged
procedure, (2) the potential unfairness to the prisoner, and (3) the
availability of alternative procedures which are less burdensome to the
prisoner. Specifically, Sturm held that at a minimum, due process re-
quires the Adult Authority to support its determinations on parole
applications with a statement of the reasons for its decisions. Since
chapter 326 deals essentially with parole release decisions, it is likely
that the Sturm formula could be applied in determining what procedural
rights are to be enjoyed by prisoners about to be released from state
mental hospitals. It should be noted -that chapter 326 does not affect
the standards employed in making the decision to release a prisoner,
but only changes the procedure utilized in the decision making proc-
ess.
Criminal Procedure; superior court sessions
Government Code §69801 (new).
SB 417 (Biddle); STATS 1974, Ch 1186
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Chapter 1186 has added section 69801 to the Government Code to
permit extra sessions of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County
to be held on the grounds of an institution of the Department of Cor-
reotions. Facilities in which a pilot project may be established to hold
such extra sessions may be leased for up to 50 years from the state
(pursuant to §14670 of the Government Code) with the concurrence
of the county board of supervisors, a majority of the superior court
judges of the county, and the Director of the Department of Corrections.
Extra sessions may be held only in facilities which are on prison grounds
but are separate and apart from the other facilities of the institution.
Chapter 1186 also requires the Judicial Council to report to the legis-
lature on the operation of any court which is holding extra sessions
pursuant to section 69801.
COMMENT
Chapter 1186 is unique since it enacts the first California statute
which expressly authorizes court sessions to be held on prison grounds.
According to the Legislative Counsel's analysis, proponents of this meas-
ure intend to establish a courtroom facility at the California Institution
for Men at Chino, and this appears to have been the legislative intent
behind the chapter. Permitting superior court sessions to be held on
prison grounds will presumably ,affotd greater prison and courtroom se-
curity whenever prisoners reenter the judicial arena. Conducting
court sessions in a prison 'atmosphere may, however, prove highly preju-
dicial to prisoners in several situations. If a jury trial is held on prison
grounds, the atmosphere surrounding the jurors may impress upon them
an attitude of bias against the prisoner. Such a bias could prevent the
prisoner from having a fair trial and therefore constitute reversible error.
Criminal Procedure; laboratory and technical assistance
Penal Code 911050.5 (amended).
AB 1756 (Crown); STATS 1974, Ch 114
Support: California Defense Investigators' Association; California
Public Defenders' Association
Opposition: California District Attorneys' and Peace Officers' Associ-
ations
Chapter 114 has amended Penal Code Section 11050.5 in an effort
to balance the technical facilities and personnel which are available to
the district attorney with the technical facilities and personnel available
to the public defender. Section 11050.1 formerly provided that the
Attorney General could make available to specified agencies the De-
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partment of Justice's laborAtory facilities, personnel, and technical ex-
perts. Such assistance was givep, as a mAtter of policy, only to agen-
cies concerned with (h investigation of vine or for purposes of ap-
prehending and prosecuting criminals.
As amended, section 11050.5 permits the Attorney General, upon
request by any public defender, to make available to such public de-
fender the Department of Justice's laboratory facilities, personnel, and
technical experts for the purpose of assisting in the representation by
such public defender of persons in criminal proceedings. The Attorney
General may contract with each county whose public defender requests
such assistance for the reasonable cost of supplying such assistance.
Unless such a contract is made, no such assistance shall be given to the
public defender. Section 11050.5 also requires that the Attorney Gen-
eral shall forward to the district attorney of the county in which the
public defender is located a copy of all information supplied under the
section to the public defender. This section, therefore, requires the
Department of Justice to supply information to those agencies prose-
cuting and defending the same defendant. As it is possible that such
a provision may create a conflict of interests in a given situation, the
section provides that if -the requirement that copies of the information
be sent to the local district attorney is found to be invalid on its face or
in a particular case, the provision allowing a public defender to re-
ceive the assistance of the Department of Justice shall be inoperative.
See Generally:
1) Wrrm, CA noTwA CUmmiIN PROCmDJRE, Dikcovery §§271-274 (1963), (Supp.
1973).
Criminal Procedure; destruction of controlled substances
Health and Safety Code § 11479 (new).
SB 939 (Biddle); STATS 1974, Ch 598
Under existing provisons of the Health and Safety Code, controlled
substances (drugs and narcotics specified in division 10, commencing
with § 11000) are subject to destruction upon issuance of a court order
(§§11474, 11474.5, 11486). Chapter 598 has added section 11479
to the Health and Safety Code to permit the head of a publicly oper
ated crime laboratory, whenever it receives material suspected of being
a controlled substance, to destroy without a court order that amount
of the seized substance which exceeds ten pounds, if samples and photo-
graphs of the substance are taken, and an -analysis thereof made, and
if the chief of police approves the detailed request of the laboratory
for the destruction of the substance. At least 30 days prior to the
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destruction of the substance, written notice must be given to the de-
fendant or his attorney, stating that requests for samples of the sub-
stance must be made prior to the date of destruction.
Criminal Procedure; newsman's privilege
Evidence Code § 1070 (amended).
AB 3148 (Sieroty); STATS 1974, Ch 1456
SB 1358 (Song); STATs 1974, Ch 1323
Support: California Newspaper Publishers' Association
Prior to the amendment of Evidence Code Section 1070, persons
connected with newspapers and news broadcasting companies could
not be cited for contempt when they refused to disclose, in a judicial,
legislative, or administrative hearing, the source of any information ac-
quired in their capacity as newsmen. Section 1070 has been
amended to extend the protection afforded by the "newsman's privi-
lege" in two particulars. First, the privilege may now be exercised by
persons employed by magazines or other periodical publications. Pre-
viously, section 1070 did not protect such persons [Cepeda v. Cohane,
233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)]. Secondly, section 1070 has
been amended to provide that not only may newsmen refuse to disclose
the source of their information, but they may also refuse to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving,
or processing information for communication to the public. "Un-
published information" includes information not disseminated to the
public by the newsman, whether or not related to any information
which has been disseminated. "Unpublished information" includes, but
is not limited to, notes, outtakes (mistakes or parts of tape edited out),
photographs and ,tapes, as well as any data not itself disseminated to
the public through a communications media.
COMMENT
In Farr v. Superior Court [22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342
(1971), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1972)], the court -affirmed an
order citing appellant for contempt when he refused to disclose the
source of information which he obtained from one of the attorneys in-
volved in a murder trial. The attorneys in that trial were prohibited by
an Order re Publicity from releasing for public dissemination the con-
tent or nature of any testimony which might be given at trial. Farr, a
newspaper columnist, thereafter acquired from one of the attorneys
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subject to the order, a copy of evidence which was to be introduced
at trial. Soon afterwards, Farr wrote a column describing in substan-
tial detail the evidence he had obtained.
The attorneys in the case were subpoenaed by the court. Each de-
nied that he gave the evidence in question to Farr, and Farr refused
to reveal the source of his information. Farr justified his refusal to
answer on the basis of Evidence Code Section 1070, which, he claimed,immunized him from the power of contempt. The court disagreed and
cited Farr for contempt. In affirming the contempt citation, the appel-
late court held that under the specific facts in litigation, section 1070
was an unconstitutional infringement on the judiciary's power [22
Cal. App. 3d at 69, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348]. The court found that
courts have a constitutional duty to ensure that criminal defendants en-
joy a fair trial as well as a duty to control officers of the court [22 Cal.
App. 3d at 70, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 348], and that section 1070 infringed
upon those duties, thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine.
Farr did not, however, state that the newsman's privilege to withhold
information at trials is in all cases unconstitutional. Farr may only
stand for the proposition that when an order of the court has been vio-
lated, thereby resulting in publicity prejudicial -to a criminal defendant,
the newsman in that particular case may not be immunized from the
judicial power of contempt. On the other hand, Farr may be an inval-
idation of section 1070 in all cases. Clarification of the meaning of
Farr will have to await further litigation involving the "newsman's
privilege." The amendments to section 1070 effected by chapters
1456 and 1323 purport to expand and clarify the "privilege," but do
not address the basic issue raised in Farr. The "newsman's privilege"
is not an absolute privilege -to withhold information in all litigation,
for it is merely an immunity from ,a contempt of court or similar ad-
ministrative or legislative body sanction, and is not a privilege prevent-
ing him from being pressured through other means to reveal his source
of information. A judge may still strike whatever defenses a newsman
may have in a libel action or may still render a default judgment against
him. Nor does section 2043 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly
immunize newsmen from its sanctions for failure to permit discovery.
Criminal Procedure; organic therapy
Penal Code Article 2 (commencing with §2670) (new).
AB 2296 (Sieroty); STATS 1974, Ch 1513
Support: State Bar of California
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Provides that organic therapy, as defined, may be administered
to persons involuntarily confined only if administered pursuant to
a court order; requires that before any competent person so confined
may be treated with organic therapy, such person's informed con-
sent must first be given; provides that organic therapy may be
administered to an incompetent person only after a court hearing
is held; permits temporary use of shock treatment in emergencies
without prior court approval.
"Organic therapy" is the term used to describe various kinds of med-
ical treatments and operations used to affect or alter a person's thought
processes, sensations, feelings, perceptions, and amentations or mental
activity generally. Organic therapy has recently been used on Califor-
nia state prison and mental hospital inmates, several of whom have
likened their experiences under such treatment to dying [Shapiro,
Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Co-
ercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. R!v. 237, 246
(1974)]. Chapter 1513 has added article 2 (commencing with
§2670) to the Penal Code to provide that any application of organic
therapy (defined extensively in §2670.5) to a competent person in-
voluntarily confined must be administered pursuant to the person's
informed consent. The refusal of such competent person to submit to
organic therapy prohibits all applications of organic therapy to him
except in emergencies. Organic therapy may be administered to an
incompetent person only after a court hearing has been held.
Specifically, section 2670 has been added to the Penal Code to de-
clare that all persons enjoy a fundamental right to be free from en-
forced interference with their thought processes through the use of or-
ganic therapy. To effectuate this declaration, section 2670.5 prohib-
its the administration of organic therapy -to state prisoners unless the
prisoner first gives his informed consent to such treatment, which con-
sent may be withdrawn at any time. Organic therapy shall be applied
to a consenting inmate only after compliance with the requirements of
sections 2675 through 2680 (dealing with a court hearing). A person
who lacks the capacity to give his informed consent, however, may be
administered organic therapy other than psychosurgery if the warden or
superintendent of the facility in which the person is confined secures
a superior court order to administer such treatment in accordance with
sections 2675 through 2680. No person lacking the competency to
give his informed consent to psychosurgery may be administered such
treatment in any case. This section does not prohibit the administra-
tion of drugs intended -to cause adverse reactions to the ingestion of
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alcohol or drugs, provided that such administration of drugs is not
connected with such program of conditioning.
Section 2671 provides that, notwithstanding section 2670.5, if a
confined person attempts to or actually does inflict substantial physical
harm upon another, or presents as a result of a mental disorder an im-
minent threat of substantial harm -to himself or others, the attending
physician may authorize the use of shock treatments for up to seven
days in any three-month period in order to alleviate such danger. Shock
treatments may -also be administered without prior judicial approval for
up to three months in any one-year period to persons consenting to
such treatment.
Section 2672 defines "informed consent" as meaning that -a person
must knowingly, intelligently, and without duress or coercion, clearly
and explicitly manifest to the attending physician his consent to the
proposed organic therapy. Persons diagnosed as mentally ill, disor-
dered, abnormal, or defective are not to be automatically deemed in-
capable of giving informed consent. Persons incapable of overtly man-
ifesting their consent to the attending physician and persons unable to
understand the information specified in section 2673 shall, however,
automatically be deemed incapable of consenting to organic therapy.
Chapter 1513 also prescribes in detail those procedural steps which
are prerequisite to performing organic therapy on an inmate, includ-
ing: (1) the physician must provide the inmate with complete infor-
mation; (2) the warden must obtain the inmate's consent and must in
all cases petition the court for authorization; (3) the inmate may pe-
tition the court to prohibit approved therapy and be given counsel and
medical experts if he is financially unable to retain same; (4) a hearing
on the petition conforming to due process guarantees; (5) determina-
tion of the inmate's capacity to give consent; and (6) review of whether
there is a compelling reason justifying the proposed treatment, whether
the organic therapy represents sound medical practice, and whether
alternate therapeutic techniques are available (§ §2673-2679).
All inmates shall be informed of their rights under this chapter, and
shall be entitled to communicate with, and be visited by, specified
persons free from censorship or interference. Violations of this chapter
are punishable under the provisions of chapter 4 (commencing with
§2650) relating to the protection of prisoners (§2650), the unauth-
orized punishment of prisoners (§2651), and the prohibition against
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments or injurious treat-
ments upon prisoners (§2652). No provision of chapter 1513 pro-
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hibits the imposition of civil liability upon physicians and facilities
who administer organic therapy to persons in violation of this chapter.
Criminal Procedure; diversion of criminal drug offenders
Penal Code § 1000.4 (amended).
AB 3096 (Vasconcellos); STATS 1974, Ch 1014
Chapter 2.5 (commencing with §1000) of the Penal Code provides
a mechanism to divert narcotic and drug ,law violators from the criminal
justice system into a noncriminal rehabilitation program. The diver-
sion program allows defendants charged with specified drug-related
offenses to participate in a rehabilitation program rather than face crim-
inal prosecution. The charges pending against the defendant are dis-
missed upon successful completion of the diversion program. Section
1000.1 requires the probation department to prepare a report on a
criminal defendant who is eligible for 'the diversion program, and sec-
tion 1000.2 delineates the procedures to be followed by the court in
considering the diversion of a criminal offender. Section 1000.4 of the
Penal Code has been amended to extend the operation of chapter 2.5
to January 1, 1977. The full effect of this extension is questionable,
however, since a provision of chapter 2.5 has been declared unconstitu-
tional. Specifically, section 1000.2 provides that a defendant may not
be diverted under the provisions of chapter 2.5 unless the district at-
torney concurs in the determination to divert. In People v. Superior
Court [11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974)],
the California Supreme Court held that the decision to divert a defend-
ant into a rehabilitation program pursuant to section 1000.2 is an ex-
ercise of judicial power, and that the provision of section 1000.2 re-
quiring the consent of the prosecutor before a trial court may order
that a qualified defendant be diverted violates the separation of powers
doctrine. The practical effect of chapter 1014, therefore, is that the
full benefits of the diversion program will be retained for another two
years without the unconstitutional invasion of judicial authority ob-
jected to in People v. Superior Court.
See Generally:
1) Comment, Diversion and the Judicial Function, 5 PAC. LU. 764 (1974).
Criminal Procedure; criminal offender record information
Penal Code §13126 (repealed); §§13125, 13150, 13152, 13153,
13177 (amended).
SB 2217 (Song); STATS 1974, Ch 790
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Chapter 790 has been enacted to define and limit 'the kinds of in-
formation which may be included in criminal offender record informa-
tion systems compiled pursuant to chapter 2 (commencing with
§13100) of the Penal Code. Chapter 2 was added to the Penal Code
in 1973 [CAL. STATS. 1973, c. 992] to establish procedures governing
criminal offender record information systems [See 5 PAC. L.J., RE-
VIEW OF SELECTED 1973 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 336 (1974)].
Chapter 790 specifies that it shall become operative on July 1, 1978,
which is also the effective date of chapter 2 (commencing with §13 100)
of the Penal Code. Section 13125 formerly provided that state and
local criminal offender record information systems could include, but
were not limited to, a list of specified kinds of information such as per-
sonal data, arrest data, and court data. Section 13126 formerly spec-
ified that the Department of Justice could modify this list to include
other information in criminal offender record information systems.
Chapter 790 has repealed section 13126 and the Department of
Justice is no longer free to modify the information list specified in sec-
tion 13125. Section 13125 has also been amended to expand slightly
the list of information which may be included in criminal offender re-
cord information systems to include an individual's jail history and
whether he has ever been cited and released. Conforming technical
changes have been made in section 13150 (reporting of information),
section 13152 (forms specified by the Department of Justice on which
information is to be compiled), and section 13152 (data related to ar-
rests for intoxication). Section 13177 has been amended to provide
that chapter 790 shall not be construed to prohibit the Department
of Justice from acquiring any other information which, by statute, it
may obtain from criminal justice agencies. Prior to amendment, sec-
tion 13177 provided that the Department of Justice could require crim-
inal justice agencies to report information other than the kind specified
in section 13125, or require that it be reported more quickly, or pro-
mulgate other regulations that would improve criminal justice informa-
tion systems. The net effect of chapter 790, therefore, is to greatly
curtail the power of the Department of Justice to acquire information
about citizens which is not specifically mentioned by statute.
Criminal Procedure; citizens' complaints
Penal Code §832.5 (new).
AB 1305 (Crown); STATS 1974, Ch 29
Support: California District Attorneys' and Peace Officers' Associa-
tions
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Chapter 29 adds section 832.5 to the Penal Code to require city
police and sheriffs' departments to establish procedures to investigate
citizens' complaints against the personnel of such departments and to
make available to the public written descriptions of those procedures.
Though section 832.5 mandates the establishment of complaint investi-
gation procedures, each department remains free to adopt its own pro-
cedures.
COMMENT
It is at least questionable whether chapter 29 does or can apply to a
chartered city with the power of "home rule." The California Constitu-
tion provides that chartered cities "may make and enforce all ordinances
and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to re-
strictions and limitations provided in their several charters ... "
[CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(a) (emphasis added)]. It is further pro-
vided that it "shall be competent in all city charters to provide . . .
for: (1) the constitution, regulation, and government of the city police
force. . . ." [CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(b)]. The issue which may arise
under chapter 29, then, is whether a statute which compels city police
departments to establish a citizen complaint investigation procedure is
an unconstitutional infringement on the right of charter cities to "make
and enforce all . . . regulations in respect to municipal affairs." Be-
cause the term "municipal affairs" is undefined by the constitution,
California courts will have to determine if such regulations are "mu-
nicipal affairs," or are matters of "statewide concern." A matter of
"statewide concern" is definitionally not a "municipal affair," and may
therefore be regulated by general state law [Baron v. Los Angeles,
2 Cal. 3d 535, 539, 469 P.2d 353, 355, 86 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675
(1970)]. If a matter is of "statewide concern," the general law of
California is said to preempt any chartered city ordinances and regula-
tions. Whether or not a subject is of "statewide concern" is a question
which "must be determined from the legislative purpose in each in-
dividual instance." [Santa Clara v. Von Raesfeld, 3 Cal. 3d 239, 246,
474 P.2d 976, 979, 90 Cal. Rptr. 8, 11 (1970)]. In passing upon
chapter 29, therefore, California courts will have to decide whether the
state legislature considered regulation of police investigations into cit-
izens' complaints to be of such importance that "it is the intent and
purpose of such general law to occupy the field to the exclusion of
municipal regulations." [Baron v. Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 539,
469 P.2d 353, 355, 86 Cal. Rptr. 673, 675 (1970)]. Neither the
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bill itself nor 'the legislative background material available indicates
what the legislature's intent was in enacting chapter 29.
See Generally:
1) Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CA. L. Rlv. 1055 (1972).
2) Comment, Strumsky And The Source Of California Chartered City Powers, this
volume at 85.
Criminal Procedure; blood and urine tests
Government Code §27491.25 (amended).
AB 2623 (Bannai); STATS 1974, Ch 204
Support: California District Attorneys' and Peace Officers' Associa-
tions
Government Code Section 27491.25 formerly required the coroner
to take blood samples of persons who had died in motor vehicle ac-
cidents, in order to determine the alcoholic and barbituric acid con-
tents of the body. As amended, section 27491.25 requires the coroner
to also take urine samples from the deceased for the same purpose. In
addition, the coroner may, under Government Code Section 27491.4,
use such blood and urine samples to determine the amphetamine deriva-
tive contents of the body.
COMMENT
Dr. Thomas Noguchi, Los Angeles County Coroner, indicates that
50 percent of the vehicle drivers involved in fatal traffic accidents
have at least a trace of alcohol in their bloodstreams, that 10 percent
have traces of barbituric acid in their bloodstreams, and that one to
three percent have evidence of amphetamine derivatives in their blood-
streams. [California Assembly Committee on Health, Coroner's
Blood Tests, Jan. 14, 1974 (public hearing) (testimony of Dr. Thomas
Noguchi)]. It is anticipated that requiring coroners to take urine sam-
ples from traffic accident victims will reveal the presence of ampheta-
mine derivatives more often than will blood samples alone because am-
phetamine derivatives dissipate more rapidly in the bloodstream than in
urine. The practical effect of chapter 204, therefore, will be to increase
the likelihood that definitive evidence of amphetamine intoxication will
be available in criminal and civil actions.
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